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Abstract 
The paper addresses whether or not the exchange rate or some other dimension of the external 
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Optimal Simple Monetary Policy Rules  
in a Small Open Economy with Exchange Rate Imperfections 
 
 
1. Introduction 
            A large number of closed economy studies show that simple feedback money rules, 
especially of the Taylor type, work well in simulated economic models to deliver low 
inflation rates and output stability in the presence of monetary and real shocks. Similarly, 
many empirical studies report that Taylor policy specifications can be used to describe the 
actual behavior of central banks in several countries.1  
             In the small open economy literature, a number of similar studies of monetary policy 
rules have been undertaken, but a consensus conclusion has not yet been reached. That is, the 
literature has not yet resolved whether the Taylor rule is sufficient or whether the exchange 
rate should form part of the policy rule. Authors advocating external considerations include 
Ball (1999) who uses a backward-looking open economy model with sticky prices to argue 
that a money rule that includes the real exchange rate will perform better than either simple 
inflation targeting or the use of the Taylor rule, unless the latter is modified in important 
ways.2 In a dynamic stochastic forward-looking general equilibrium model with the 
incomplete exchange rate pass-through, Monacelli (2003) finds that optimal commitment 
entails the smoothing of deviation from the law of one price and hence requires more stable 
nominal and real exchange rates. Using a two-country model, Benigno and Benigno (2000) 
and Weerapana (2000) report substantial (world) welfare improvement when an exchange rate 
term is incorporated into the policy rule. Similarly, Smets and Wouters (2002) argue that an 
exclusive focus on the stabilization of domestic price inflation is no longer optimal when 
import prices are sticky and exchange rate pass-through is gradual and Malik (2005) 
demonstrates that the welfare-enhancing policy implies a “dirty floating” under domestic 
inflation targeting when incomplete and imperfect asset markets are introduced to the model.  
On the other hand, writers such as Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2001), Aoki (2001), 
Gali and Monacelli (2002) find that the policy problem in a small open economy in which the 
households can share consumption risk internationally and exchange rate pass-through is 
complete is essentially identical to the policy problem faced by a closed economy. Hence the 
closed economy rule remains optimal if combined with flexible exchange rates. A similar 
result is obtained by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002) when the analysis is extended to a two-
                                                 
1 See, for example, Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), Clarida, Gali 
and Gertler (1998, 2000). 
2 For robustness, Ball (1999) considers the six rules, distinguished mainly by the size of their reaction 
coefficients and lagged interest rate terms. 
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country setting. When exchange rate pass-through is incomplete, Dib (2003) shows that the 
optimal policy problem for a small open economy is isomorphic to that in a closed economy.  
Kollmann (2002), Batini, Harrison, and Millard (2003), Leitemo and Soderstrom (2005), and 
Adolfson (2007) all find that welfare performance is improved by incorporating an exchange 
rate term into the policy rule but only marginally so.  
Standing somewhat in the middle, Taylor (1999) uses a multi-country model with 
complete exchange rate pass-through to simulate a policy rule for the European Central Bank 
that includes in the interest rate rule the exchange rate as well as output and inflation, and 
finds that policy outcomes are mixed.  In some countries (such as France and Italy), including 
the exchange rate leads to better performance, but in others (such as Germany) the result is 
poorer. In closely related work, Devereux and Engel (2003) show that the impact of 
alternative exchange rate regimes on the policy performance is related to the pricing strategy 
used to set the prices of import goods. In particular, when prices are pre-set in the producer’s 
currency (denoted producer currency pricing, PCP), floating exchange rates are optimal in the 
presence of country specific real shocks. However, when prices are pre-set in the consumer’s 
currency (denoted local currency pricing, LCP), there is no benefit to having exchange rate 
flexibility. In a small emerging economy, Choudhri (2005) finds that the relative performance 
of the alternative rules depends on the social welfare criterion used for assessing different 
policy rules and on the type of shock that the economy experiences.3
In this paper we re-examine the role of external factors in simple money rules by 
evaluating the relative performance of a series of different simple monetary policy rules 
applied to a small open economy when the monetary authority lacks current information. The 
objective is to discover whether there exists a set of regularities that describe the optimal 
properties of a simple optimal money rule. The small open economy developed here is 
distinctive in that as well as incorporating Calvo pricing with indexation (to induce sticky 
domestic prices), the model incorporates incomplete exchange rate pass-through (because of 
quadratic costs of import price adjustment) and also assumes that asset markets are 
incomplete. With a domestic economy of this type and facing a number of domestic and 
external shocks, the economy is assumed to have a welfare maximizing central bank that can 
choose across a number of potential money rules for interest rate setting.   We examine 
whether the ranking of these choices change as the central bank loses information. 
Five simple rules are evaluated with and without interest rate smoothing. Rule 1 is 
our most comprehensive money rule, corresponding to the case where the monetary authority 
                                                 
3 Choudhri argues that the loss function used to evaluate different monetary policy rules should also 
include exchange rate variability if there is fear of a floating exchange rate within the emerging 
economy. Variability of the interest rate may also be of concern, especially if financial institutions are 
vulnerable. Traditional loss functions typically do not include these terms. 
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sets the short-term interest rate in response to changes in the inflation rate, the real GDP 
output gap, the real exchange rate gap, and the law of one price gap. This we call the 
benchmark rule (B).  Dropping the law of one price gap from Rule 1 gives us Rule 2, called 
the real exchange rate rule (ER).  For comparative purposes, we replace the real exchange rate 
term in Rule 2 with the law of one price gap. This becomes Rule 3, the exchange rate pass-
through rule (PT). Rule 4 has no openness component and corresponds to the Taylor rule 
(TR). Rule 5 further supposes that the monetary policy authority chooses to focus exclusively 
on inflation. This we call inflation targeting (IT). 4  
          Four information scenarios are considered for the central bank. The first assumes that 
the central bank has access to “full information”.  In particular it is assumed that the central 
bank can observe all relevant contemporaneous variables (such as GDP and the price index), 
can calculate all necessary unobservable variables (such as the Wicksellian natural interest 
rate and the natural level of output). This serves as our benchmark full information case. Next 
we assume that while the central bank can observe the current value of all observable 
variables, it cannot acquire enough information to compute accurately the important 
unobservable variables and hence must use steady state values instead. In the third case, the 
central bank can acquire information on all variables but only with a one period lag. The final 
case also assumes that all observable variables can be known accurately only with a lag, but 
that again this information is insufficient to allow the monetary authority to calculate the 
relevant unobservable variables.  Instead the monetary authority adopts the steady state 
values. These different information cases are used to analyze if and how the optimal simple 
monetary policy changes with the withdrawal of accurate information.  
         The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the small open 
economy model. The loss function employed to evaluate the alternative simple policy rules is 
derived in Section 3 and Section 4 explains the calibration of the structural model. Optimal 
simple policy rules are investigated in section 5 and the conclusions are summarized in the 
final section. 
           
2. A small open economy model 
We suppose that the world economy consists of two parts: a home economy and a 
foreign one, the latter called the rest of the world. Compared to the rest of the world, the home 
economy is small so that developments there have little impact on the rest of the world. This 
implies that policy makers deciding on domestic monetary policy can take foreign variables, 
                                                 
4 The terminology used here differs somewhat from that used by Svensson (2000). Svensson links 
“targeting” to the monetary authority’s objective. Hence when stabilizing inflation around the inflation 
rate target is the only objective for monetary policy, Svensson calls this strict inflation targeting.  When 
there are additional objectives for monetary policy, for instance stabilizing output as well, monetary 
policy is called flexible inflation targeting.   
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such as foreign output, prices, inflation rates, and interest rates as given or as exogenous 
stochastic variables. 
The model used to analyze monetary policy in this context is a variant of the dynamic 
New Keynesian model applied to a small open economy such as Canada (see Gali and 
Monacelli, 2002). The model consists of a representative household who purchases both 
home produced and imported goods for consumption from its supply of specialized labor and 
the profits from its ownership share of domestic firms.  Households are also assumed to be 
able to reallocate consumption over time by accessing a one-period risk-free (non-contingent) 
domestic bond and a risky foreign bond.  The foreign bond is assumed to be denominated in 
the foreign currency and traded freely internationally subject to a risk premium which 
depends on both the net foreign asset position of domestic economy and a time-varying shock 
to the risk premium (Adolfson, 2005). 
The model assumes a large number of identical firms that hire specialized labor to 
produce differentiated domestic goods that are used for both domestic consumption and 
export. For simplicity we assume that there is no capital accumulation and there are no 
intermediate goods. The labor market is assumed to be competitive with flexible wages but 
each domestic producer is assumed to be a monopolistic competitor setting prices by using 
Calvo’s (1983) pricing specification. We assume that there are no transportation costs or trade 
barriers between the small open economy and the rest of the world so that the law of one price 
holds when imported goods cross the domestic border.  However, in setting the domestic 
currency price for these differentiated goods, importers face quadratic adjustment costs that 
will generate deviations from the law of one price in the short run.  In the literature this is 
described as incomplete exchange rate pass-through. For simplicity we assume that the law of 
one price holds for domestic exporters. 
In our setup, the monetary authority is assumed to maximize community welfare by 
choosing as its policy instrument the short-term interest rate.  The policy instrument is used to 
correct distortions arising in the model from stochastic real shocks impacting on the model in 
the presence of sticky prices. The secondary distortion that results from the presence of 
monopolistic competition in the model is dealt with separately through an optimal output 
subsidy. Aside from these tax/transfer activities, government behavior is not modeled 
explicitly. 
 
2.1 The Representative Household 
The small open economy consists of a continuum of households indexed by . 
The representative household seeks to maximize the expected value of the discounted sum of 
]1,0[∈i
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time separable utilities subject to an intertemporal budget constraint. Suppose then that total 
expected utility can be denoted as 
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where ( 1,0∈ )β  is the subjective discount factor, , denotes a composite bundle of 
consumption goods,  is the level of real money balances held by the household, and 
 is the proportion of household time devoted to the labor market (so that  is the 
proportion of time enjoyed as leisure by the representative household).  Following Woodford 
(2003), we assume that each of the differentiated goods is produced with a specialized type of 
labor and that the representative household supplies each type of specialized labor. In this 
case, , where  is the quantity of labor of type i supplied by the 
household.
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While the household derives utility from consumption, holding real money balances, 
and taking leisure, the presence of an exogenous disturbance t1χ  in the utility function implies 
that household utility is subject to a stochastic taste shock.  This is given more specific form 
through the per-period utility function 
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Here σ/1 denotes the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption, ς/1  is the 
interest elasticity of money demand.  µ is the elasticity of marginal disutility with respect to 
labor supply6. The shock to the utility function makes the consumption weight in the utility 
function stochastic. Hence a change in t1χ  represents a preference shock to consumption, 
where t1χ is assumed to follow the first-order autoregressive process given by 
ttt 11,111 lnln εχρχ += − ,        
and where 10 1 << ρ  and the error term, t1ε , is normally distributed with zero mean and 
standard deviation 1σ . 
Turning next to the household’s budget constraint, the representative household is 
viewed as entering period t  with a set of financial assets.  These include its claim on the 
profits arising in domestic firms (including imports), its initial nominal money holdings, and a 
portfolio consisting of its initial holdings of a risk free domestic bond and a foreign bond 
                                                 
5 This implies that the import sector uses no labor, merely re-pricing goods imported from abroad. 
6 Note that µ/1 denotes the elasticity of labor supply with respect to real wage. 
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denominated in units of the foreign country’s currency. We assume that only the foreign bond 
can be traded internationally.  Because the household cannot insure himself from all risks 
financial asset markets are incomplete and the domestic household is assumed to have to pay 
a premium on its foreign borrowing that depends directly on the size of its net foreign asset 
position, .  It then follows that because the household can accumulate or decumulate 
foreign assets in any period, differences can arise between the income earned and the level of 
consumption expenditures in period t . Hence in real terms, the representative household’s 
budget constraint can be written as,  
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where  is the level of money holdings chosen for the end of period t.  and are the 
country specific values in period 
tM tB
*
tB
1+t  dollars of one period domestic and foreign bonds 
chosen to be held at the end of period t.  and denote, respectively, the gross nominal 
domestic and the risk free foreign (world) interest rate arising between t  and . Following 
Benigno (2001) and Adolfson (2005), we define 
tR
*
tR
1+t
)lnexp( 2ttbNFA χ+−  as the risk premium 
that the representative household must pay to borrow on world markets, a premium that 
increases in the size of the net foreign debt held by the representative household, and b is a 
constant that governs the size of the risk premium.7 Because that premium is subject to a 
period specific shock, t2χ , the time dependent risk premium will produce temporary 
departures from uncovered interest parity in the short run. Here  is the 
domestic value of net foreign assets held by the household, 
tttt PBNFA /
*ε=
tε  is the nominal exchange rate, 
defined as the price of foreign currency (in terms of domestic currency), and t2χ  is the shock 
to the risk premium. Analogous to t1χ , t2χ  is defined as  
ttt 21,222 lnln εχρχ += − ,         
where 02 <ρ  and t2ε  is white noise.  
In (3) the representative household is modeled as receiving a nominal wage rate for 
each unit of type  labor provided, . The household also owns a representative share of 
all firms producing domestic goods so that the nominal value of dividend income (profits) 
i )(iWt
                                                 
7  Having the risk premium depend on the level of net foreign borrowing allows the model to equate 
differences that may arise between the household’s subjective rate of time preference and the risk free 
world interest rate. 
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received from firm  is equal to in period t. The representative household is also 
assumed to own a representative share of the profits (losses) made on each differentiated 
import good, , profits consisting of  in period t. Finally, the household is 
subject to a lump-sum tax levied by the government  at the start of period t just sufficient to 
over the output subsidies made by the government (to induce the efficient level of domestic 
and import output).  
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Finally, to simplify the analysis, we assume that there is no other government 
spending on final goods so that any seigniorage on money creation will be rebated to 
households in the form of a lump-sum transfer, T, and all output subsidies paid to offset firm 
markups are funded through lump-sum taxes. Hence in our economy, the government budget 
constraint is, ttttFtFMtt TMMCPYP +−=+ −1,,ττ , where τ and Mτ  are subsidy rates 
motivated in greater detail later.8 Thus ttYPτ  denotes the subsidy paid by the government to 
domestic producers in period t; tFtFM CP ,,τ  denotes the subsidy paid by the government to 
importers; and 1−− tt MM represents the seigniorage revenue arising from money creation. 
Note that seigniorage need not be positive.  
          The representative household then chooses , , ,  and to maximize 
lifetime utility given in (1) subject to the flow budget constraints given in (3). Rewriting the 
first order conditions for an internal optimum for , , , ,  and 
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8 In this model the two potentially different subsidy rates will end up being equal. 
 8
Equation (4) is the Euler condition, representing the household’s optimal 
intertemporal allocation of consumption given domestic nominal interest rate and price levels 
arising in the two time periods. It can also be written as  
( )11111 1// +−++− += tttttttt ERCEC πχβχ σσ , 
which states that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption at  and  is 
equal to the real marginal rate of transformation in “production”— that is, the real return 
available when using domestic bonds to transfer consumption between  and .  Here the 
inflation rate is written in terms of the consumer price index, 
t 1+t
t 1+t
1+tπ , and defined as 
( ) tttt PPP /11 −= ++π .  Similarly (5) is another version of the Euler condition,  
( )12*1111 1/)lnexp(/ +−++− ++−= tttttttttt EbNFARCEC πχχβχ σσ , 
where optimal intertemporal consumption requires the marginal rate of substitution between 
consumption at  and  is equal to the real marginal rate of transformation in 
“production” when using foreign bonds to transfer consumption between  and . Note 
that the risk premium term 
t 1+t
t 1+t
)lnexp( 2ttbNFA χ+− appears here because of our assumption of 
incomplete asset markets.   
Equation (8), the well-known uncovered interest parity condition, is the implication 
of (4) and (5) holding simultaneously. Compared to the usual uncovered interest parity 
condition, (8) has one more term--the risk premium--that guarantees that asset market returns 
converge when the asset markets are incomplete. 
            Equation (6) represents the household’s optimal money holding condition.  This sets 
the marginal rate of substitution between real money balances and consumption equal to the 
opportunity cost of holding money (the money rate of interest)9. Equation (7) represents the 
intratemporal optimality condition between leisure and consumption, requiring the marginal 
rate of substitution between leisure and consumption to be set equal to the real wage.  
In addition to the these first order conditions and the model’s initial conditions, the 
following transversality conditions must hold,  
0lim 3 =∞→ tttt mλβ , , 0/lim 3 =∞→ ttttttt RPBλβ
and ( ) 0)lnexp(/lim 2**3 =+−∞→ ttttttttt bNFARPB χελ ,                (9) 
where  is the level of real money balances. ttt PMm /=
           To solve the domestic firm’s optimization problem, it is first necessary to derive the 
demand for domestically produced goods arising from those consumers located in the rest of 
                                                 
9 Because the return on the bond, 11 −=+ tt Ri , is paid in period t+1 rather than in period t, the return 
needs to be discounted to the time of choice in period t, i.e. divided by . tR
 9
the world.  To do this, we assume that the representative household in the rest of the world 
has the same preferences as domestic households.  
 
2.2 Firm Behavior 
To model the supply side of our economy we assume that there is a continuum of 
firms indexed by i∈[0,1] in the small open economy. All firms use the same technology to 
produce a similar but differentiated good. The common technology incorporates constant 
return to scale (for simplicity, capital is ignored) and is written as, 
)()( iNAiY ttt = ,                                         (10) 
where  is the aggregate quantity of the labor employed by firm i and  is an exogenous 
technology shock common to all firms.  The shock is assumed to follow an AR (1) process, 
)(iNt tA
AttAt AA ερ += −1lnln , where 10 << Aρ , and Atε  is a white noise disturbance that is 
assumed to be normally distributed, serially uncorrelated, with zero mean and standard 
deviation σA.  
Firm i  is assumed to hire labor in a competitive labor market but to be the sole seller 
of its differentiated product.  This makes each firm a price taker in the input market and a 
price setter in its output market. The existence of market power, however, complicates our 
analysis because we eventually wish to evaluate the welfare consequences of alternative 
monetary policy rules through their effects on the representative household’s utility function.  
Doing so requires the use of a linear approximation (to the utility function) that is valid only 
in the neighborhood of the social optimum (see Woodford, 2003).  Hence to offset the 
distortion arising under monopolistic competition, we assume that the government uses a 
production subsidy (τ ) set in such a way that in the steady state the net markup is zero (see 
Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997 and 1999, and Smets and Wouters, 2002).10
The firm then chooses the employment level, , and the selling price, , 
that will maximize its expected profits subject to its production technology and demand 
function. With the ability to recontract in the labor market each period, firm i will choose the 
quantity of each period that minimizes the input cost of producing any level of output.  
That is,   
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10 Despite using a subsidy that is optimal from the point of view of the steady state subsidy rate, some 
overall distortion may arise period to period due to fact that the distortions arising from tax incidence 
and market power may be dependent on the size of the shocks realized each period. This period-
specific distortion is assumed to be of second order. 
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where the Lagrangian multiplier becomes, tH ,ϕ , the firm’s real marginal cost of production 
(inclusive of the subsidy). The first order condition for  is then )(iNt
tHtttH PAiWi ,, /)()( =ϕ . Notice that because all firms exhibit the same constant returns to 
scale technology, the real marginal cost for each firm is the same and is independent of its 
individual output level.  This, together with equal availability of labor supplies and perfectly 
competitive labor markets, means that we can rewrite the first order condition without each 
firm specific index and derive the following representation of each firm’s marginal cost, 
tHt
t
tH PA
W
,
, =ϕ .           (12) 
Turning next to the firm’s optimal pricing decision, we add price stickiness by 
following Calvo (1983) as later adapted for price indexation by Christiano et al. (2001)11.  In 
Calvo’s model, a random fraction, ω−1 , of all firms will receive each period a signal that 
allows them to adjust their price. The remaining fraction,ω , must keep their previously set 
price fixed.  Christiano et al (2001) modify this to allow the fraction, ω , who cannot reset 
their price this period to index it to last period’s inflation rate. We assume that the degree to 
which these firms can index their price isδ .  
Under this price setting strategy, firm i with the opportunity to set a new price this 
period will choose the price that solves the following maximization problem, 
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subject to its demand function, . Here the stochastic discount 
factor, , given in (4) as 
)()()( * ,, iCiCiY ktHktHkt +++ +=
kttQ +, ( )( )( ) σχχβ −+++ tkttktktttk CCPPE /// 11 , is used to compute the 
real value in period t of a unit of a good produced in period kt + .  
The solution to (13) is the new price, , that will be chosen by firm i when it 
gets the opportunity to adjust its price. Since all firms face the same cost and demand 
conditions, each will pick the same new price so that we can drop the individual subscript i 
and write . In addition, we use to stand for the price indexation rule 
)(, iP
n
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n
tH PiP ,, )( = δ)( ,tkHX
                                                 
11 Christiano et al. (2001) consider two specifications for how indexation can affect the firm that cannot 
reset its price each period. The first specification has 1, −Π= tiit PP , whereΠ is the steady state value 
of the gross inflation rate (see also Erceg, Henderson and Levin, 2000 and Yun, 1996). Christiano et al 
refer to this case as static price updating. The second specification sets 1,1 −−Π= titit PP and is called 
dynamic price updating. The latter specification is motivated in part by claims that the former does not 
generate sufficient inertia in inflation (see Fuhrer and Moore, 1995, and Gali and Gertler, 1999). We 
adopt the second specification. 
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[ ]1,0∈δ  denotes the degree of price indexation. Thus when 1=δ , all firms’ prices are fully 
indexed and when 0=δ , no prices are indexed.   
Differentiating (13) with respect to  gives the following first order condition for 
an internal optimum,      
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Equation (14) implies that the new nominal price picked by firm i in period t will be a 
markup, )1/( −θθ , over expected future nominal marginal cost. Because the firm is forward 
looking (given the previous pricing decisions made by the firm’s rivals as embodied 
in ), optimal price setting requires an inflation forecast and a set of predetermined prices 
to inform the firm’s current price decision.   
1, −tHP
In the special case where 0=ω , all firms can adjust their price each period. This 
implies that prices are perfectly flexible so that (14) collapses to  
tH
tH
n
tH
P
P
,
,
,
)1)(1(
ϕτθ
θ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+−= . 
In each period each firm sets its new money price so that its relative price is equal to 
a constant markup (inclusive of the subsidy) over its marginal cost. This is standard 
optimizing behavior under the monopolistic competition.  Under the assumption that the 
optimal subsidy is chosen by the government, 1]/)1[( −−= θθτ  so that , 
i.e., price equals marginal cost. 
tHtH
n
tH PP ,,, / ϕ=
 
2.3 Import Pricing Behavior 
In a small open economy when assets markets are incomplete and inhabitants cannot 
insure themselves perfectly from foreign shocks, the exchange rate (nominal, real or both) 
becomes an important endogenous variable and one that the monetary authority may need to 
take into account when setting policy. To understand the exchange rate’s impact on the open 
economy one needs to know exactly how changes in the exchange rate will affect the 
domestic price of imports, that is, how exchange rate changes pass-through into domestic 
prices. In the literature there are two extreme hypotheses.  First, foreign producers (exporters) 
could set their export good price optimally in terms of their own (foreign) currency and then 
simply translate set the small open economy price into domestic currency by the exchange 
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rate.  Here the import good price in the domestic market is set as .  This 
is called producer currency pricing (PCP) and implies that the exchange rate elasticity is one 
and exchange rate pass-through is complete in the short run. On the other hand, foreign 
producers could set their export good price directly in terms domestic currency in relation to 
the demand conditions faced there. This is called local currency pricing, LCP, (or pricing to 
market, PTM,) and implies that in the short run, the elasticity of the foreign export good price 
with respect to the exchange rate will be zero.  
)()( *,, zPzP tFttF ε=
Note that while the degree of exchange rate pass-through into domestic prices is 
related to pricing method used by the firm, it is not the only factor. Another key determinant 
of the degree of exchange rate pass through is the presence of costs of price readjustment.  
These lead directly to sticky prices in the destination market. To model incomplete pass-
through, we consider a representative importer who imports a representative differentiated 
import good at the cost .  The importer is then allowed to change the domestic 
price if it wishes, but can do so only by incurring a quadratic adjustment cost. Following 
Rotemburg (1982) and Laxton and Pesenti (2003), the adjustment cost (per dollar sold) is 
defined as 
z )(*, zP tFtε
2
2,1,
1,,
, 1)/(
)(/)(
2 ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −=
−−
−
δ
ω
tFtF
tFtFM
tM PP
zPzP
AC             
where 0≥Mω , scales the magnitude of the price adjustment cost as a function of its rate of 
change. In (21), the adjustment cost rises as the importer’s specific inflation rate rises relative 
to some fraction, δ , of the past inflation rate experienced by the import good sector as a 
whole. Here the δ allows for some quasi-automatic price adjustment process equivalent to the 
feature of indexation allowed for under Calvo pricing. In terms of its contribution to the 
analysis, the δ allows the model to capture the nominal inertia appearing empirically in 
inflation dynamics.12  Lastly, just as was the case for domestic goods, the fact that the 
importer has market power means that the government will set an optimal subsidy, Mτ , to 
induce the efficient level of output. Then because we have assumed that the elasticities of 
substitution among each variety of domestic and import goods are both equal toθ , the 
optimal subsidy rates will also be equal.  That is, )1/(1 −== θττ M . 
                                                 
12 The adjustment cost can be specified differently. For example, a variant of this specification relates 
changes in the importer’s price inflation rate to a steady state gross inflation rate, 1≥Π  instead of the 
last period of inflation rate, ( ) 2/1)(/)( 21,,1, −Π= − zPzPAC tFtFMtM ω , and alternative versions 
add both the steady state Π and the lagged inflation rate to the quadratic adjustment cost term, ( ) ( ) .2/1)//()](/)([2/1)(/)( 22,1,1,,221,,1, −+−Π= −−−− tFtFtFtFMtFtFMtM PPzPzPzPzPAC ωω
See Ireland 2001 and 2004 for details. 
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Hence facing this price adjustment cost, the representative importer will set its price 
 by solving the following maximization problem subject to the downward sloping 
demand function that it faces, 
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The first order condition for is )(, zP
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where  denotes the gross inflation rate of import prices and where 
symmetry again produces 
1,,, / −=Π tFtFtF PP
tFtF z ,, )( Π=Π . In the special case where 0=Mω , (15) collapses 
to )()()(
1
)()1( *,,
*
,, zPzPimpliesandzPzP tFttFtFttFM εεθ
θτ =−=+ ,         
when the optimal subsidy is set. 
 
2.4 The Log-linearization of the model 
         Log-linearizing the relevant equations and then rewriting the equations of motion in 
terms of efficiency gaps, we obtain the following equations that describe the evolution of 
economy. 
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where equations (16) to (22) are the Phillips curve, the import price inflation, the IS equation, 
the real exchange rate equation, the LM equation, the net foreign asset  position equation, and 
the law of one price gap, respectively, 
)1(
)1)(1(
βδω
ωβωγ +
−−= , )]1)(2(1[ −−+= σηααφ , 
ˆ ˆ f
t t tx Y Y≡ − , , and is our definitions of the output gap , the 
real exchange rate gap, and the real money balance gap.
f
tttg qqq ˆˆ, −= ftttg mmm ˆˆ, −=
13  If we define  
so that . Following Monacelli (2003), we call this the law of one 
price gap. is the log deviation of output from its steady state value when prices are 
tFtFtt PP ,
*
, /ε=Ψ
tFtFtt PP ,
*
,
ˆˆˆˆ −+=Ψ ε
f
tYˆ
                                                 
ˆ13 Note that we are following Woodford (2003) in defining  rather than Y  as the output gap. Since tx t
YYY tt loglogˆ −= and YYY , . This is the distortion in 
output arising only from the fact that domestic output prices and import good prices are sticky. 
f
t
f
t loglogˆ −= fttt YYx loglog −=
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completely flexible. Similarly,  is the log deviation of the real exchange rate from 
its steady state value when prices are completely flexible. Here we define the 
Wicksellian rate as the real rate of interest that would arise under perfectly 
flexible domestic and import price (so that the law of one price holds for import 
goods).   
f
tqˆ
f
tHr ,ˆ
 In a small open economy, foreign output is exogenous. Here we specify it as 
incorporating a stochastic shock. In particular, foreign output is assumed to follow an AR (1) 
process, , where tytyt YY ,
*
1
* lnln ερ += − yε is a white nose process with a zero mean and a 
constant standard error yσ . 
          We now close the model by defining a general form for the monetary policy 
rule. In our small open economy model, inefficiency arises and welfare falls because 
contemporary shocks are not incorporated into the price setting behavior adopted by 
monopolistically competitive domestic producers and foreign good importers in the 
presence of incomplete asset markets.  Hence because of incomplete asset markets 
and sticky domestic and import prices, actual outcomes differ from the efficient levels 
that would arise if prices were fully flexible.  Monetary policy is then designed to use 
the information available on the gaps between actual and efficient levels to set the 
interest rate to counter the effects of these market imperfections.  Hence monetary 
policy can be described as having the monetary authority set an interest rate as a 
function of the gaps arising between the interest rate, level of output, inflation rate, 
the real exchange rate, and the law of one price gap and the levels these values that 
would take under complete asset markets and perfectly flexible prices.   
 
3. The loss function 
            Following the method set out in Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) we derive the loss 
function for the small open economy incorporating all the special model features described 
above. This can be written as  
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Before leaving this topic it is important to note that the period loss function that 
appears standard in the literature is usually the weighted sum of only two arguments: the 
squared variances of inflation around its targeted level *Πˆ and the output gap.  That is, 
ttH xaL var)ˆˆvar(
*
, +Π−Π= ,               
where is often assumed to be zero, and takes a value somewhere between 0 and 1.  One 
typical value given to a is 0.5 (see Svensson, 2000). Hence the standard loss function 
typically ignores important efficiency gaps that arise in even slightly more general models.  In 
addition, when we use the calibrated parameter values that appear appropriate for simulation 
purposes (in the following section), the calibrated weight placed on the output gap from our 
utility function is approximately 0.0025.  While this weight may seem small, it is worth 
noting that such a small weight is not specific to our model, but rather typical of the weights 
found in other calibrated studies, where the loss function has been derived from the 
underlying representative household utility function. For example, using the calibrated 
parameter values adopted by Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), the weight that is placed on 
the output gap in their loss function is 0.00298.  Similarly, Gali and Monacelli (2002) find 
that their value for is equal to 0.0027.   
*Πˆ a
a
 
4. Calibration  
The solution to the model represented by the set of simultaneous equations is too 
complicated to work with analytically in a tractable way.  Hence we follow the literature in 
setting up a quantitative dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to evaluate alternative 
monetary policy rules based on the model’s simulated results. To that end we calibrate the 
structural parameters of the model. These parameter values were chosen from the set of 
empirical estimates reported in the literature. In most cases, the parameter values used in our 
calibration are close to the mean of the available set of estimates. The final parameter values 
used in our simulations appear in summary form in Table 1. 
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Table 1    The Parameter Values Chosen to Calibrate the Model 
Parameters Values Parameters Values 
Utility Shocks 
β  0.99 Aρ  0.85 
σ  1.2 
1ρ  0.90 
ς  2.5 
2ρ  0.50 
µ  3.0 
*yρ  0.85 
  
Aσ  0.0098 
Shares 
1σ  0.0351 
α  0.4 
2σ  0.0050 
b  0.01 *yσ  0.0070 
δ  0.1 Substitution Elasticities 
ω  0.75 η  1.2 
Mω  400 θ  6 
 
 
5. Optimal Simple Rules  
         The model presented in section 2 can be written compactly as 
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where  is a column vector of predetermined variables, and the initial values of  are 
all givens. , on the other hand, is a column vector of non-predetermined variables.  
is the gap between the short-term interest rate and the Wicksellian natural rate and is the 
policy instrument. 
tX ,1 0,1X
tX ,2 tgR ,
1+tε  is a column vector of innovations to the economic system and  is a  
zero column vector. Lastly,  and  are matrices, and 
20
1A 2A B  a column vector of the structural 
parameters, all of which are assumed to be constants.   
         Assume then that the monetary authority can precommit to a simple policy rule 
of the form , where  is the policy instrument, tt FXR −=ˆ tRˆ F is a row vector 
constrained to be sparse in some specified way which depends upon the policy 
maker’s preferences and . The optimal simple rule will solve for the 
n×1
[ ', 21 ttt XXX = ]
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values of F that minimize the loss function subject to the economic system denoted by 
(27). 
 
5.1 Inertial Optimal Simple Rules 
            When an economy is hit by shocks, the rate of inflation and other economic variables 
deviate not only from their steady state values but from the values associated with temporary 
market clearing under perfectly flexible prices. It is in response to this departure from 
efficiency that the policy maker adjusts its policy instrument, the short-term interest rate, to 
bring the observed variables back into line with their designated targets. However, given the 
persistence that exists in the model and the degree of variable interaction that arises through 
time and finally the lagged information available to the policy maker, optimal policy will 
often consist of a series of small adjustments in the same direction through time rather than a 
single immediate jump. This outcome, one that is typically observed in the data, is called 
monetary policy inertia (Woodford, 1999) and is most often mimicked in the policy rule 
through the use of a lagged interest rate (interest-rate smoothing). Because we (and many 
others) find that rules with smoothing perform better than rules without, our comparative 
analysis of optimal simple rules in this small open economy adopts interest-rate smoothing.  
At a later stage, the interest-rate smoothing term can be dropped to see how optimal simple 
rules perform without the effect of smoothing.   
          In its most general form, the optimal simple interest-rate smoothing rule, written in 
terms of domestic output prices, can be written as 14
.ˆˆˆˆˆ 1,,, −Ψ +Ψ+++Π+= trttgqtxtHf tHwt RqxrR φφφφφφ π      (28) 
We begin by setting rφ  equal to 0.8.  The case where 10 << rφ  generates interest rate inertia 
as the policy maker adjusts only partially to the targeted gaps and is a value typically used in 
empirical studies (see, for example, Clarida et. al., 2000)..  
The optimized reaction coefficients and welfare losses corresponding to the five 
simple monetary policy rules are reported in Tables 2 through 4. We begin by discussing 
optimal policy for Case 1, the information case where the central bank is assumed to be able 
                                                 
14 This form differs slightly from that defined in section 2.  The reason for this departure is because as 
Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) argue, that there is no any reason to restrict attention to the case 
10 <≤ rφ , although only in that case can the policy rule can be described as involving partial 
adjustment toward to a “target” interest rate dependent on current output and inflation. In section 6.3 
we find that the optimized value of rφ  is greater than one. Finally if rφ is a constant then we can 
rewrite the policy rule in the general form used previous chapters.  In that case, the values of the 
optimized reaction coefficients, such as πφ , are found using the formula )1/(* rφφφ ππ −= , 
where *πφ  is the statistic currently reported in the tables above.  For example when 8.0=rφ , πφ for 
Rule 1 in Table 6.1. becomes 5.741 instead of 1.1482. The welfare loss remains the same.    
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to observe or calculate all necessary information.  Hence from Table 2, the following general 
results can be noted.  
First, the three optimal simple rules that involve the exchange rate in some form 
(Rules 1-3) perform best, each working at least as well as the Taylor Rule. Then of the three 
exchange rate rules, the benchmark rule performs best, outperforming the Taylor rule. If one 
briefly scans the remaining three tables, it can be seen that the significance of including rather 
than excluding the exchange rate in the monetary policy rule continues to hold for all four 
information cases.  
Table 2  
Case 1: the Monetary Authority measures the inflation rate using domestic output 
prices 
.ˆˆˆˆˆ 1,,, −Ψ +Ψ+++Π+= trttgqtxtHf tHwt RqxrR φφφφφφ π  
Optimized reaction coefficients Policy 
Rule 
wφ  πφ  xφ  qφ  ψφ  
Welfare Loss 
1  (B) 0.4439 1.1482 -0.0311 0.1023 -0.0542 0.1598 
2  (EX) 0.4920 1.3348 0.0204 0.0046 0 0.1608 
3  (PT) 0.4860 1.3553 0.0228 0 -0.0037 0.1608 
4  (TR) 0.4903 1.3460 0.0229 0 0 0.1608 
5  (IT) 0.5276 1.4830 0 0 0 0.1610 
 
           The second point is that the marginal gain in welfare from incorporating some element 
of the exchange rate into the policy rule is small for the current case where information is 
“perfect”. For example, the ratio between the smallest welfare loss (Rule 1) and the largest 
one (Rule 5) in Table 1 is 0.9925. If we compare just those rules that involve the exchange 
rate and the Taylor rule (Rule 4), the ratio becomes even smaller. For example, the ratio of 
Rule 1 to Rule 4 is 0.9938. Furthermore, if we compare Rules 2 and 3 to 4, the ratio becomes 
1. In other words, the inclusion of some forms of the exchange rate into the policy rule (as in 
Rules 2 and 3) does not improve the welfare at all relative to the Taylor. This is consistent 
with the findings of Adolfson (2007) who argues on this basis that the improvement social 
welfare from incorporating an exchange rate term into an otherwise fully optimized policy 
rule will be practically zero, irrespective of the degree of the exchange rate pass-through. In 
response to this challenge, however, several points need to be emphasized. First, the 
conclusion that adding the exchange rate into the policy rule does not enhance the social 
welfare holds only under relatively strong conditions. For example, even in the current case 
some forms of exchange rate use have resulted in welfare improvement. More significantly, 
however, Adolfson takes neither the lack of information nor its uncertainty into account.  As 
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we will see below, when the central bank is given access to less and less accurate current 
information for deciding upon policy, the inclusion of the exchange rate in the policy rule is 
always the welfare enhancing.15  In some cases it will produce relatively large increases in 
welfare.  Adolfson also finds that an indirect exchange rate response, attained by having 
policy react to CPI inflation rather than domestic inflation, is welfare enhancing.  As we will 
see below, our results are quite different. 
           The third general finding that arises first in Table 2 is that the size of the optimized 
inflation coefficient, πφ , is much larger than the other reaction coefficients. This result is 
typical of both ours and others findings and not at all unexpected. That is, given the calibrated 
values of the loss function derived from the model’s utility function, the parameter values 
used in calibrating lead the policy maker to place a much higher weight on inflation in 
comparison with the other terms in the loss function. For example, given our calibrated values 
(and the re-scaling of the model so that the weight placed on the inflation rate is 1), the 
corresponding weights put on the other loss function gaps are: 0.0025 for the output gap; 
0.00022 for the real exchange rate gap; and 0.0885 for the interest rate gap. Therefore to 
minimize the welfare loss the central bank must react strongly to inflation. This asymmetric 
weighting is also found in Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), for example.  They report 
optimal values for the reaction coefficients corresponding to a Taylor rule with interest-rate 
smoothing of 1.22, 0.06, and 1.28, respectively, while without the interest-rate smoothing 
term, the optimal values found are 2.88 and 0.02, respectively.  It can also be shown in our 
model, for example, that by increasing the weights in the utility function given to the output 
gap, the real exchange rate gap, and the interest rate gap to 0.05, 0.05, and 0.5, respectively, 
that the optimal parameter values on the output gap and the Wicksellian natural rate 
corresponding to the Taylor rule (Rule 4) are increased to 0.2943 and 0.7174, respectively, 
while the reaction coefficient associated with the inflation rate decreases to 1.0291.      
             A fourth finding is that the signs of the optimized reaction coefficients are not always 
positive, except for inflation. This is similar to findings noted by Rotemberg and Woodford 
(1999).  While such findings seem counter-intuitive, the likely explanation for the occasional 
negative coefficient is that when the shocks to the economy result in a positive output gap and 
higher inflation, the optimal inflation reaction coefficient is so large that it produces an 
overshooting of the interest rate relative to the output gap, hence requiring a perverse 
response to the output gap to minimize the loss function. Some support for this interpretation 
is given when for these perverse cases we change the weighting of the loss function.  For 
                                                 
15  We should add a note of caution in that the arbitrary specificity of the utility function chosen for the 
analysis means that the welfare implications are better interpreted as ordinal indicators rather than 
cardinal measures.  That is, the analysis is a better indicator of policies that are better or worse rather 
than as an indicator of exactly how much better or worse each policy is. 
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example, if we use the revised re-weighting of the loss function reported immediately above, 
the optimized reaction coefficients corresponding to Rule 1 are found to result in the 
following rule 
ttgttH
f
tHtt qxrRR Ψ−++Π++= − ˆ19.037.009.0ˆ17.1ˆ81.0ˆ8.0ˆ ,,,1 , 
where the sign of optimized coefficient on the output gap now is positive instead of negative. 
Note that the welfare losses reported in Table 2 are all global minima. Then if we require the 
xφ  in Rule 1 to be positive (as above), the equilibrium is still found to be determinate but will 
yield a larger welfare loss.  In this case, the welfare loss becomes 0.1615.      
         In Case 2 we remove information from the monetary authority by assuming that the 
ability to observe contemporaneous market values is insufficient to determine the flexible 
price values required to determine the targeted gaps in the money rules.  Hence Table 3 
reports the results for the five monetary rules when the policy maker must replace the 
Wicksellian natural interest rate and the other unobserved flexible price variables in the 
money rules with their steady state values.  
           As one would expect, a comparison of the welfare losses in Table 3 with those reported 
for the same measure of inflation in Table 2 shows that the welfare losses in Table 3 are 
always bigger than those in Table 2. That is, the less information that is available to the 
authority making the policy decision, the larger will be the resulting welfare loss (the smaller 
the welfare gain that can be made from pursuing monetary policy optimally). But while the 
overall welfare losses are all larger, the same pattern of welfare losses continues to arise 
across the five different monetary rules.  In particular, the three exchange rate rules now 
always dominate the Taylor and Inflation Targeting money rules.  
          Table 3  
Case 2: Steady state values while targeting inflation measured in domestic output prices 
1,
ˆˆˆˆˆˆ −+Ψ+++Π= trttqtxtHt RqYR φφφφφ ψπ  
Optimized reaction coefficients Policy Rule 
πφ  xφ  qφ  ψφ  
Welfare Loss 
1  (B) 7.6458 0.1583 -0.0125 -0.0576 0.1888 
2  (EX) 7.8389 0.2052 -0.0811 0 0.1889 
3  (PT) 7.6229 0.1517 0 -0.0624 0.1888 
4  (TR) 7.7623 0.1733 0 0 0.1890 
5  (IT) 10.6935 0 0 0 0.1944 
 
           Finally, we note that the results for the optimal monetary rules in Table 3 also generate 
reaction coefficient values for the exchange rate and the law of one price that are often 
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negative.  In part, it may be that because these negative coefficients arise in those cases where 
the inflation reaction coefficient is quite large that the interest rate is overshooting with 
respect to the exchange rate and so requires perverse exchange rate adjustments to preserve 
determinacy.  It also suggest, however, that sign (as well as the size) of the reaction 
coefficients may be affected not only by the loss function chosen but also by the information 
set assumed available to the policy maker.   
         In Tables 4 and 5 we repeat the procedure followed in Tables 2 and 3, except for the 
information that is assumed to be available to the policy maker. In Tables 2 and 3, we 
assumed that the policy maker could access current period information on market variables, 
while in Tables 4 and 5, we assume that the monetary authority can observe or access market 
values only with a one period lag.  Case 3 follows Case 1 in assuming that the monetary 
authority can use its market information to calculate the flexible price values (but with a one 
period lag), while Case 4 follows Case 2 in assuming that the monetary authority cannot 
calculate the flexible price values and must use steady states values.   
         Broadly speaking, the removal of contemporaneous information does not change the 
basic ranking of monetary policy rules observed in Tables 2 and 3. That is, in all these Tables 
at least one of the three exchange rate rules dominates the Taylor and Inflation Targeting 
money rules.  The results then reinforce the earlier suggestion that for a small open economy 
some incorporation of external constraints on the economy in the exchange rate rule will 
dominate money rules that focus only on the traditional “closed” economy features of the 
money rule.   
         However, while the general pattern of results may remain the same, three additional 
observations are worth noting. First, as expected, the withdrawal of information from the 
monetary authority increases the overall welfare loss.  Comparing directly comparable tables, 
such as Tables 4 and 2, Tables 5 and 3, we see that the minimum welfare losses in Tables 4 
and 5 are all larger than found in Tables 2 and 3.  
          Second, it is interesting to note that the welfare losses in Case 3 are all significantly 
smaller than those found for Case 2. Note, for example, that the welfare loss arising from the 
use of Rule 1 in Case 3 (see Table 4) is 0.1617, while being 0.1888 in Case 2 (see Table 3).  
The former is only 85.65% of the latter while the same ratio for the Taylor rule is 85.82%. 
This general finding is of particular interest because it suggests that the ability to use flexible 
price values in the money rule (even if that information is old) can dominate the ability to 
access more current information but use steady state values in the policy rule.  Implicitly, 
even though Case 3 assumes that the central bank uses one period lagged information, the 
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amount of information it has access to in using flexible price values incorporates more 
relevant information than does the use of current information in Case 2.16   
         Finally, as would be expected, the welfare loss in Case 4 is the largest of all four cases 
considered here.  This is the case where the monetary authority unambiguously has the least 
amount of information. 
Table 4  
Case 3: lagged information while targeting inflation measured in domestic output prices 
111,11,1,
ˆˆˆˆˆ −−Ψ−−−− +Ψ+++Π+= trttgqtxtHf tHwt RqxrR φφφφφφ π  
Optimized reaction coefficients Policy 
Rule 
wφ  πφ  xφ  qφ  ψφ  
Welfare Loss 
1  (B) 0.5307 1.4317 -0.0411 0.0925 -0.0475 0.1617 
2  (EX) 0.5813 1.5925 0.0015 0.0079 0 0.1622 
3  (PT) 0.5727 1.6103 0.0054 0 -0.0020 0.1622 
4  (TR) 0.5763 1.6076 0.0055 0 0 0.1622 
5  (IT) 0.5896 1.6525 0 0 0 0.1623 
 
Table 5  
Case 4: lagged information, steady state targets and inflation in domestic output prices 
11111,
ˆˆˆˆˆˆ −−Ψ−−− +Ψ+++Π= trttqtxtHt RqYR φφφφφπ  
Optimized reaction coefficients Policy Rule 
πφ  xφ  qφ  ψφ  
Welfare Loss 
1  (B) 3.5134 0.0635 -0.0167 -0.0834 0.1955 
2  (EX) 3.5598 0.1331 -0.1268 0 0.1966 
3  (PT) 3.5061 0.0552 0 -0.0899 0.1955 
4  (TR) 3.5071 0.0879 0 0 0.1981 
5  (IT) 4.2006 0 0 0 0.2030 
 
             
         A summary of our findings thus far leads to the following tentative conclusions. First, in 
a small open economy where asset markets are not perfect and where there the degree of 
exchange rate pass through is incomplete, the exchange rate is an important endogenous 
variable that the policy maker should incorporate into its policy rule. Doing so lowers welfare 
                                                 
16  We will show below that when rφ  is optimized instead of simply setting it to be 0.8 here, the 
finding will be modified.  
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losses. Second, while it is not surprising that the better is the information used by the policy 
maker, the larger is the welfare gain associated with using monetary policy optimally, what is 
interesting is that the better the information accessible to the policy maker, the less will be the 
marginal welfare gain from incorporating the exchange rate into the policy rule. Our analysis 
then suggests that the use of the exchange rate in the policy rule will be more valuable to 
those small open economy monetary authorities with less good information on the current 
state of their economy.  Finally, when considering the choice of the price index to be used as 
the measure of inflation in the monetary rule, our analysis suggests that the central bank 
should measure inflation in terms of domestic output prices.   
 
5.2   Optimal Smoothing Rules 
          Strictly speaking the “optimal simple rules” presented in Tables 2 through 5 are optimal 
only in a restricted sense since the reaction coefficient on the interest rate smoothing term was 
assigned. However, even though most estimates of rφ have fallen in a small range about 0.8,17 
it is of interest to ask how the optimal simple policy rules would respond to a lifting of that 
restriction. The results of this re-optimization are presented in Tables 6 through 9. Because 
the results are broadly similar across the different cases, we restrict specific comment to the 
observations that can be seen from Table 6 below.  
Table 6 
Case 1: the Monetary Authority measures the inflation rate using domestic output 
prices 
.ˆˆˆˆˆ 1,,, −Ψ +Ψ+++Π+= trttgqtxtHf tHwt RqxrR φφφφφφ π  
Optimized reaction coefficients Policy 
Rule 
wφ  πφ  xφ  qφ  ψφ  rφ  
Welfare 
Loss 
1  (B) -0.0570 
(0) 
2.1011 
(2.0456) 
0.0107 
(0.008) 
0.0036 
(0.0089) 
0.0302 
(0.0245) 
1.9290 
(1.8246) 
0.1586 
(0.1586) 
2  (EX) 0.0725 
(0) 
1.9345 
(2.0073) 
-0.0077 
(-0.0092) 
0.0392 
(0.0412) 
0 1.6606 
(1.7857) 
0.1587 
(0.1587) 
3  (PT) -0.0657 
(0) 
2.1143 
(2.0625) 
0.0125 
(0.0126) 
0 0.0324 
(0.0289) 
1.9464 
(1.8304) 
0.1586 
(0.1586) 
                                                 
17 For example, Clarida et al (2000) find that the estimate of rφ  is 0.68 for pre-Volcker period, and 
0.79 for Volcker-Greenspan era. Across six different quarterly U.S. data samples (differing in their 
definition of output gap), Kozicki (1999) reports a range for rφ from 0.75 to 0.82, while across 16 
different quarterly samples of U.S. data (differing in output gap, inflation, and sample period 
definition), Amato and Laubach (1999) report a range of rφ from 0.78 to 0.92. 
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4  (TR) 0.0691 
(0) 
2.0736 
(2.1472) 
0.0115 
(0.011) 
0 0 1.6583 
(1.7767) 
0.1589 
(0.1589) 
5  (IT) 0.0609 
(0) 
2.1932 
(2.2534) 
0 0 0 1.7155 
(1.818) 
0.1589 
(0.1589) 
Note that the values in parenthesis are the optimized reaction coefficients and welfare loss 
yielded by the same rule when wφ is set equal to zero. 
 
The first and the most interesting observation is that the optimized value of rφ  is 
quite different from the one reported in the literature and the value used in section 5.1.  Here 
the optimized coefficient is greater than, rather than less than, one. This implies that the 
monetary policy process is not stable for all given initial values of the interest rate.  As 
Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) point out, the interesting feature is that the “explosive” 
monetary rule does not produce explosive ‘equilibria’.  Rather, the explosive nature of the 
rule implies that the interest rate set must jump to a value that preserves the expected 
equilibrium value of the interest rate.  That is, intuitively, the prospect of an exponential 
increase in real rate leads to a substantial reduction in expected future aggregate demand 
through the aggregate demand function, which in turn induces firm to cut prices today. That 
decline in prices ensures that the interest rate need not rise but instead converge on its 
equilibrium value. 
          The second change is that the absolute values of the optimized coefficient on the 
Wicksellian natural rate wφ  become much smaller when the coefficients on the lagged interest 
rate rφ  are optimized. They were much larger, around 0.5, when rφ was set equal to 0.8. This 
suggests that that there might be some degree of substitutability in how the two forms of 
interest rate appear in the money rule—the optimized values of the coefficients on the 
Wicksellian natural rate versus the optimized value the lagged interest rate coefficient. To test 
whether there is a trade-off arising between the Wicksellian rate and the lagged interest rate in 
the money rule, we experiment with different values in terms of Rule 2. Table 6 currently 
shows that the optimized values of wφ  and rφ are 0.0725, and 1.6606, respectively.  Suppose 
now that that we simply decrease rφ  and set it at 1.2.  Re-optimization over the other values 
in the rule results the optimized value of wφ  increasing to 0.284. Next, Table 2 has shown that 
when rφ  was set at 0.8, wφ  becomes 0.4920, and when we decrease rφ even further to 0.2, 
wφ  now jumps to 1.572. Finally, Table 10 shows that wφ  further jumps to 3.128 when rφ  is 
set to be zero.  This exercise is consistent with the hypothesis that the lagged interest rate term 
performs some of the same functions as the Wicksellian natural rate in the money rule.   
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A third observation arising when Table 6 is examined in conjunction with Table 7 is 
that when the lagged interest rate coefficient is optimized, difference in policy performance 
for each of the different monetary policy rules in Cases 1 and 2 is negligible despite the 
information loss arising in the second case.  There appear to be two important reasons for this 
particular finding.  First to the extent that the optimized lagged interest rate substitutes for the 
Wicksellian rate, the elimination of the Wicksellian rate in Case 2 should have relatively little 
effect on the overall outcome. This prediction, arising from the observation in point two 
above, can be tested by imposing a zero coefficient on the Wicksellian rate in Table 6 and 
then re-optimizing.  The results of doing this are reported as the second line (in parentheses) 
of each row in Table 6.   As the table shows, the removal of the Wicksellian natural rate term 
does not change the size of the welfare loss for each money rule.   The second difference that 
arises between Cases 1 and 2 is in the use of flexible price output and law of one price gap in 
Case 1 versus the use of the deviation from the steady state in Case 2. Then because the 
weights in the loss function ascribed to these two dimensions are quite small, the overall 
change in the welfare loss from using steady state values versus flexible price values is 
negligible.  This latter point can be confirmed by increasing the weights placed on the output 
gap and the law of one price gap in the loss function.  Doing so does now produce a larger 
deadweight loss for each money rule.  
Table 7  
Case 2: contemporaneous prices and steady state values 
.ˆˆˆˆˆˆ 1, −Ψ +Ψ+++Π= trttqtxtHt RqYR φφφφφπ  
Optimized reaction coefficients Policy 
Rule πφ  xφ  qφ  ψφ  rφ  
Welfare 
Loss 
1  (B) 2.0541 -0.0015 0.0184 0.0257 1.8238 0.1586 
2  (EX) 2.0807 -0.0143 0.0385 0 1.7888 0.1587 
3  (PT) 2.1000 0.0077 0 0.0327 1.8374 0.1586 
4  (TR) 2.2281 0.0024 0 0 1.8026 0.1589 
5  (IT) 2.2534 0 0 0 1.8180 0.1589 
     
          Fourth, the incorporation of optimal interest rate smoothing reduces even further the 
marginal welfare differences arising across the five different monetary policy rules.  What 
this means for our earlier policy conclusion is that while optimal policy should still include 
some form of exchange rate consideration, the marginal gain from doing so is now 
considerably smaller. For example, the ratio of the welfare losses yielded by Rule 1, the 
smallest welfare loss, compared to the Taylor rule (Rule 4) in Table 6 is 0.9981; compared to 
Rule 2 and Rule 4 is 0.9987, and the ratio of Rule 3 to Rule 4 is exactly the same as the ratio 
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of Rule 1 to Rule 4. This result may not be that surprising. Below we will show that when we 
compare non-inertia policy rules to rules with interest rate smoothing, the policy rules with 
inertia always perform better.  However, the marginal welfare gain is largest when any form 
of interest rate smoothing is adopted.  The marginal gain then becomes smaller as the policy 
maker moves from an arbitrary reaction coefficient to one that is optimize. This mirrors our 
finding that the gain in the performance of the money rule increases at a decreasing rate as the 
policy maker access more and more information relevant to their policy making decision.  
         Finally, as we would expect, the welfare losses arising when the optimized coefficient is 
used (in Tables 6 through 9) are all smaller than those found when the ‘traditional sized’ 
smoothing rule is adopted (in Tables 2 through 5).  For example, when the welfare losses 
summarized in Table 6 are compared directly to those listed for the same information case in 
Table 2, we find welfare gains across the five rules ranging from 0.9% to 1.4%.   
 The results for the remaining information cases are presented below for comparison. 
In general, they simply reinforce the points made above. However, there is one new finding of 
interest--the welfare losses in Case 2 (see Table 7) are now smaller (rather than larger, see 
Table 3 ) than those arising in Case 3 (see Table 8). This implies that even though the 
monetary authority in Case 2 is constrained to use steady state values in its targeted gaps, the 
use of an optimized (rather than arbitrary) coefficient for the lagged interest rate more than 
offsets the ability to use lagged flexible price values in the money rule. This finding, however, 
is again somewhat conditional on the loss function used. It can be shown, for example, that by 
increasing the utility weights given to the output gap, the real exchange rate gap, and the 
interest rate gap to 0.05, 0.05, and 0.5, respectively, as we did earlier, yield welfare losses for 
Case 2 that are larger than those in Case 3 and also larger than those generated in Case 1.  The 
welfare losses in Rule 2 from using the new weights in the loss function in Cases 1 to 3 are 
1.0388, 1.0714, and 1.0633, respectively.  
 
Table 8  
Case 3: lagged money prices and flexible price gaps 
.ˆˆˆˆˆ 111,11,1, −−Ψ−−−− +Ψ+++Π+= trttgqtxtHf tHwt RqxrR φφφφφφ π  
Optimized reaction coefficients Policy 
Rule 
wφ  πφ  xφ  qφ  ψφ  rφ  
Welfare 
Loss 
1  (B) 0.4367 1.5505 -0.0296 0.0673 -0.0297 1.0040 0.1616 
2  (EX) 0.3450 1.6785 -0.0078 0.0240 0 1.2157 0.1617 
3  (PT) 0.3295 1.7321 0.0043 0 0.0095 1.2500 0.1618 
4  (TR) 0.3687 1.7285 0.0037 0 0 1.1589 0.1618 
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5  (IT) 0.3746 1.7613 0 0 0 1.8887 0.1618 
 
Table 9 
Case 4: lagged money prices and steady state values 
.ˆˆˆˆˆˆ 11111, −−Ψ−−− +Ψ+++Π= trttqtxtHt RqYR φφφφφπ  
Optimized reaction coefficients Policy 
Rule πφ  xφ  qφ  ψφ  rφ  
Welfare 
Loss 
1  (B) 1.8047 -0.0024 0.0158 0.0197 1.7923 0.1620 
2  (EX) 1.8221 -0.0122 0.0311 0 1.7573 0.1621 
3  (PT) 1.8344 0.0054 0 0.0255 1.8006 0.1621 
4  (TR) 1.9116 0.0014 0 0 1.7523 0.1623 
5  (IT) 1.9247 0 0 0 1.7613 0.1623 
 
5.3  Robustness Analysis 
            In Section 5.1 we highlighted two key findings of our analysis: first, the more relevant 
was the information incorporated in the policy decision, the larger was the welfare gain from 
using monetary policy optimally; and second, that in our small open economy, the exchange 
rate was an important endogenous variable whose incorporation into the policy rule improved 
the economy’s performance. These outcomes are also present in Section 5.2. In this section 
we examine the robustness of these findings as a basis for conclusions respecting the policy 
performance in small open economies such as ours. 
One feature of our findings that could be seen as undermining confidence in the 
robustness of our exchange rate inclusion conclusion is the tendency, first observable in Table 
2, for the welfare loss to decrease as additional variables are incorporated into the policy rule. 
This feature is observed in the other tables as well. This suggests the following counter 
hypothesis. Perhaps the reason that the benchmark rule (Rule 1) results in a smallest welfare 
loss is simply because adding more variables will always improve the performance of a rule 
rather than because the exchange rate is itself an important targeting variable for the policy 
rule.18 Such a possibility suggests the following test: if the ‘more variables better outcome’ 
hypothesis is true, then the addition of one or more ‘significant’ variables into the policy rule 
should yield an even smaller welfare loss.  
                                                 
18 Adolfson (2007) raises a similar point. He points out that if the policy rule is excessively simple (i.e., 
is suboptimal) then the inclusion of any additional state variable is likely to yield an improvement in 
the rule. However, optimization of the reaction coefficients reduces the sub-optimality of the simple 
rule, which partly mitigates such a problem. 
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          To test this hypothesis, we first add “consumption” to Rule 1 in Case 1 when the 
monetary authority uses domestic output prices to target the inflation rate with the partial 
interest-rate smoothing (Table 2, row 1).  In that case the welfare loss associated with the 
revised optimal policy rule was 0.1598.  Second if we instead add “labor” to Rule 1, the 
welfare loss is also found to be 0.1598.  In both cases the welfare result is exactly the same as 
the welfare loss arising in their absence.  Hence the simple inclusion of additional variables in 
the policy rule does not bring down the welfare loss further as would be expected. This set of 
findings gives us greater confidence that the reason that the benchmark rule yields better 
policy performance is that the incorporation of the exchange rate and the law of one price gap 
into the policy rule incorporates more relevant information. 
To further test this hypothesis, we re-optimize after taking the real exchange rate and 
the law of one price gap out of the policy rule and substituting “consumption” or “labor 
supply” in their place.  Should these substitutions improve the performance of policy, our 
information hypothesis would be contradicted.  We begin by replacing the real exchange rate 
in Case 1 Rule 1 with “consumption” in the policy rule and then doing the same for the law of 
one price gap.  Our simulation results show that using “consumption” to replace either the 
real exchange rate or the law of price gap yields a larger welfare loss. Their respective values 
found were to be 0.1603 and 0.1603, larger than the 0.1598 the welfare loss for the 
benchmark Rule 1 reported in Table 2.  Next, we use “labor” to replace the real exchange rate 
and the law of one price gap in Rule 1 and obtain the similar results. Here the welfare losses 
associated with each test are 0.1608 and 0.1608, respectively; both larger than the original 
0.1598 loss arising under Rule 1 in Case 1. Finally, using both “consumption” and “labor” to 
replace the real exchange rate and the law of one price gap in Rule 1 improves performance 
(on their separate use) but also yields a larger over welfare loss, 0.1601, compared to the 
benchmark rule. Together these findings are strongly consistent with our interpretation of the 
information content of the openness variables—the real exchange and the law of one price 
gap—for the effectiveness of the money rule. As such, these findings increase our confidence 
in this interpretation of our results.  
           In our small economy model external considerations influence domestic outcomes in 
two ways: first through the assumption of incomplete capital markets and second through the 
law of one price gap. While the former forms part of the structure of the model, it has no one 
simple parameter by which the intensity of incompleteness can be adjusted.  In this sense, the 
latter external complication is more susceptible to manipulation. In particular, the law of one 
price gap affects welfare via incomplete exchange rate pass-through, which in turn arises 
from the assumption that the importers face quadratic adjustment costs in setting prices in the 
domestic currency. In terms of the specification adopted, the parameter Mω scales the 
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magnitude of import price adjustment costs such that the degree of exchange rate pass-
through increases as Mω  decreases. When Mω is set equal to zero, the degree of exchange 
rate pass-through is 100 percent, which implies that the law of one price gap will be zero.  In 
this case, adding to the policy rule the law of one price gap would not be expected to enhance 
the social welfare.  Similarly since the size of the distortion in the real exchange rate is 
positively related to the law of one price gap, the marginal welfare gain from incorporating 
the real exchange rate into the policy rule should also fall as Mω  decreases, but because the 
real exchange rate is just partially related to the law of one price gap, therefore the marginal 
welfare gain from incorporating the real exchange rate will be expected to be less significant 
than those from Rules 1 and 3 as Mω  varies .  
         To test this implication of the analysis, we vary the parameter Mω  between 400, which 
represents a low degree of exchange rate pass-through, and 1, representing a high degree of 
the exchange rate pass-through.19 The welfare losses WL  associated with the corresponding 
optimized simple rules and the relative welfare losses are presented in Tables 10. Table 10 
shows that in relative terms the marginal social welfare gain from incorporating the exchange 
rate and/or the law of one price gap into the Taylor Rule is large when the degree of the 
exchange rate pass-through is low, while the gain is small under a high degree of the 
exchange rate pass-through.  
Table 10 
Case 1 when Mω  varies 
Rule 1   (B) Rule 2   (EX) Rule 3   (PT) Rule 4 (TR)  
1WL  41 /WLWL 42 /WLWL 43 /WLWL
 
2WL  
 
3WL  
 
4WL  
400=Mω  0.1975 0.9841 0.1995 0.9940 0.1982 0.9875 0.2007 
100=Mω  0.2038 0.9869 0.2062 0.9985 0.2044 0.9898 0.2065 
50=Mω  0.2059 0.9932 0.2072 0.9995 02061 0.9942 0.2073 
25=Mω  0.2066 0.9995 0.2067 1 0.2066 0.9990 0.2067 
10=Mω  0.2037 0.9985 0.2040 1 0.2038 0.9990 0.2040 
1=Mω  0.1968 1 0.1968 1 0.1968 1 0.1968 
 
          As mentioned above, there is no one parameter by which we can vary the 
incompleteness of capital markets. However, the risk premium that the representative 
                                                 
19 In terms of Adolfson (2007) estimation, the degree of the exchange rate pass-through is about 10% 
when 400=Mω , and 70% when 1=Mω . 
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household must pay to borrow on world markets due to incomplete capital markets is variable 
and can be affected by the size of the shock to the risk premium, its net foreign asset position 
at the time of the shock, and the constant, b , which governs the size of the risk premium.20 
Suppose then that while other conditions remain fixed, we let the size of the shock to the risk 
premium increase.  Then since the larger the shock to the risk premium, the greater will be the 
effect of incomplete capital markets on the model leading to the larger the size of the welfare 
loss associated with that distortion. It then follows that the marginal gain from incorporating 
one of the external gaps into the money rule should increase as the size of shock to the risk 
premium increases.21
         To test this implication, we redo Table 11 for different sized shocks to the risk premium. 
The welfare losses WL  associated with the corresponding optimized simple rules and the 
relative welfare losses are presented in Tables 11. Scanning Table 11 we see that the marginal 
welfare gains from adding one of the external gaps to the policy rules become more 
significant as the size of shock to the risk premium increases. For example, in Case 1 
when , the relative gain associated with using the exchange rate in Rule 2 
compared to the Taylor rule is 1/0.9983 = 1.002, while it becomes 1/0.9191 = 1.088 when the 
size of the shock rises to .  
2
2 05.0=tε
2
2 1=tε
Table 11 
Case 1 when t2ε changes 
Rule 1   (B) Rule 2   (EX) Rule 3   (PT) Rule 4 (TR) Risk 
premium 
Shock 
1WL  41 /WLWL  2WL  42 /WLWL
 
3WL  43 /WLWL  4WL  
2
2 05.0=tε  0.1719 0.9954 0.1724 0.9983 0.1722 0.9971 0.1727 
2
2 1.0=tε  0.1833 0.9897 0.1840 0.9935 0.1836 0.9914 0.1852 
2
2 5.0=tε  0.5381 0.9236 0.5656 0.9708 0.5447 0.9349 0.5826 
2
2 1=tε  1.6441 0.9047 1.6705 0.9192 1.6702 0.9191 1.8173 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
          At present the rule most often advocated in the literature for monetary policy is the 
Taylor Rule, even for the case of small open economies subject to external shocks. However, 
the conjecture that the Taylor rule will continue to perform best when the openness of the 
                                                 
20 The risk premium is defined as )lnexp( 2ttbNFA χ+− . In this sense, capital markets are 
complete when the risk premium is one.  
21 Cecchetti et al. (2000) show that financial disturbances may cause the exchange rate to have 
destabilizing effects that should be mitigated by monetary policy, while Adolfson (2007) does not 
support it. 
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economy encounters imperfections and the reaction coefficients are found optimally has 
proved misleading if not entirely wrong.22  In our model, it is always optimal to augment the 
Taylor rule with some factor that allows for the incorporation of external complications — in 
our case either the exchange rate gap and/or the law of one price gap. This finding is robust 
across our four cases of different levels of information availability.  
Second, the addition of the lagged interest rate to an optimal simple policy rules 
typically enhances the level of social welfare and hence policy performance.  The reason why 
this is the case was explored at length and appears to be for a combination of reasons – its 
implicit ability to capture information missed in other policy instruments, the fact that welfare 
depends directly in interest rate variability, and as a way of establishing and maintaining 
commitment.  Perhaps most controversially, we find in section 5.2 that the optimized value of 
the coefficient on the lagged interest rate is greater than one. This is quite different from the 
empirical estimate usually found in the literature where the coefficient is most often found in 
the range between 0.7 and 0.9. To the extent that this model captures some of the more 
important features of small open economies, it would imply that the central banks of these 
economies have been too timid in practice.     
Finally, our analysis suggests that the marginal welfare gain from incorporating 
foreign exchange considerations and/or lagged interest rates falls as the relevant information 
available to the policy maker improves.  This is perhaps our most practical policy finding.  As 
a practical proposition, it suggests that the less well developed is the statistical information 
available to a small open economy, the larger will be the gain from including some measure 
of the size of the external shock facing the economy and/or lagged interest rates in the 
monetary policy rule.   
                                                 
22 It may be of interest to note that if “typical” reaction coefficients are assigned to the money rule in 
this small open economy model, then the loss functions measures of the five monetary policy rules will 
suggest that the Taylor Rule does work best.  As we have seen above, this result disappears when the 
reaction coefficients are determined optimally.   
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